4-bit linear relations play an important role in cryptanalysis of 4-bit crypto S-boxes. 4-bit finite differences have also been a major part of cryptanalysis of 4-bit S-boxes. Existence of all 4-bit linear relations have been counted for all of 16 input and 16 output 4-bit bit patterns of 4-bit Crypto S-boxes said as S-boxes has been reported in Linear Cryptanalysis of 4-bit S-boxes. Count of existing finite differences from each element of output S-boxes to distant output S-boxes have been noted in Differential Cryptanalysis of S-boxes. In this paper a brief review of these two cryptanalytic methods for 4-bit S-boxes has been introduced in a very lucid and conceptual manner. Two new analysis techniques, one to search for the existing linear approximations among the input vectors (IPVs) and output Boolean functions (BFs) of a particular S-box has also been introduced in this paper. The search is limited to find the existing linear relations or approximations in the contrary to count the number of existent linear relations among all 16, 4-bit input and output bit patterns within all possible linear approximations. Another is to find number of balanced BFs in difference output S-boxes. Better the number of Balanced BFs, Better the security.
Introduction
Substitution boxes or S-boxes have been a part of block ciphers from the birth of Commercial Computer Cryptography by Horst Feistel in IBM Research [1] . A 4-bit S-box contains 16 elements [2] . If they are unique and distinct then the S-box has been termed as 4-bit crypto S-box. A 4-bit Crypto S-box contains 16 unique and distinct elements vary from 0 to F in hex and index of each element which are unique and distinct also. They also vary from 0 to F in hex and follow a monotonically increasing sequential order. The elements of a Crypto 4-bit S-box may be sequential or partly sequential or non-sequential in order [2] . The elements of index of S-box also construct an identity Crypto S-box and termed as input S-box. A brief Literature survey of related literatures has been given in Crypto S-box is said to be linear cryptanalysis immune, since the existence of maximum 4-bit linear relations for that 4-bit Crypto S-box is hard to predict [3] [4]. Heys also introduced the concept of Linear Approximation Table ( The method has been described in Subsection 4.3 of Section 4.
Result and Analysis of all four algorithms have been given in Section 5. The conclusion and Acknowledgements have been made in Section 6 and Section 7 respectively.
Literature Survey
In this section an exhaustive relevant Literature survey with their specific references has been introduced to crypto literature. In Section 2.1 the relevant topic has been cryptography and cryptology, in Section 2.2 the topic has been Linear Cryptanalysis, in Section 2.3 the topic has been Differential Cryptanalysis, in Section 2.4 the topic has been cryptanalysis of stream ciphers and at last in Section 2.5 the relevant topic has been Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) of substitution boxes.
Cryptography and Cryptology
In end of Twentieth Century a bible of Cryptography had been introduced [5] .
The various concepts involved in cryptography and also some information on cryptanalysis had been provided to Crypto-community in late nineties [6] . A simplified version of DES that has the architecture of DES but has much lesser rounds and much lesser bits had also been proposed at the same time. The cipher has also been better for educational purposes [7] . Later in early twenty first century an organized pathway towards learning how to cryptanalyze had been charted [8] . Almost at the same time a new cipher as a candidate for the new AES, main concepts and issues involve in block cipher design and cryptanalysis had also been proposed [9] that is also a measure of cipher strength. A vital preliminary introduction to cryptanalysis has also been introduced to cryptanalysts [10] . At the same time somewhat similar notion as [10] but uses a more descriptive approach and focused on linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis of a given SPN cipher had been elaborated [11] . Particularly, it discusses DES-like ciphers that had been extended with it [12] . Comparison of modes of operations such as CBC, CFB, OFB and ECB had also been elaborated [13] . A new cipher called Camelia had been introduced with its cryptanalysis technique to demonstrate the strength of the cipher [14] . History of Commercial Computer Cryptography and classical ciphers and the effect of cryptography on society had also been introduced in this queue [15] . The requirements of a good cryptosystem and cryptanalysis had also been demonstrated later [16] . Description of Rijndael, the new AES provides good insight into many creative cryptographic techniques that increases cipher strength had been included in literature. A bit Later a highly mathematical path to explain cryptologic concepts had also been introduced [17] . Investigation of the security of Ron Rivest's DESX construction, a cheaper alternative to Triple DES had been elaborated [18] . A nice provision to an encyclopedic look at the design, analysis and applications of cryptographic 
Some Old and Recent References on Linear Cryptanalysis
The cryptanalysis technique to 4-bit crypto S-boxes using linear relations among four, 4-bit input Vectors (IPVs) and four, output 4-bit Boolean Functions (OPBFs) of a 4-bit S-box have been termed as linear cryptanalysis of 4-bit crypto S-boxes [3] [4] . Another technique to analyze the security of a 4-bit crypto S-box using all possible differences had also been termed as Differential cryptanalysis of 4-bit crypto S-boxes [3] [4] . The search for best characteristic in linear cryptanalysis and the maximal weight path in a directed graph and correspondence between them had also been elaborated with proper example [24] . It had also been proposed that the use of correlation matrix as a natural representation to understand and describe the mechanism of linear cryptanalysis [25] . It was also formalized the method described in [26] and showed that at the structural level, linear cryptanalysis has been very similar to differential cryptanalysis. It was also used for further exploration into linear cryptanalysis [27] . It had also been provided with a generalization of linear cryptanalysis and suggests that IDEA and SAFER K-64 have been secure against such generalization [28] . It had been surveyed to the use of multiple linear approximations in cryptanalysis to improve efficiency and to reduce the amount of data required for cryptanalysis in certain circumstances [29] . Cryptanalysis of DES cipher with linear relations [26] and the improved version of the said cryptanalysis [26] with 12 Computers had also been reported later [30] . The description of an implementation of Matsui's linear cryptanalysis of DES with strong emphasis on efficiency had also been reported [31] . In early days of this century The cryptanalytic attack based on multiple Linear Approximations to AES candidate Serpent had also been reported [32] .
Later A Technique to prove security bounds against Linear and Differential cryptanalytic attack using Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP) had also been elaborated [33] . Later to this on the strength of two variants of reduced round lightweight block cipher SIMON-32 and SIMON-48 had been tested against Linear Cryptanalysis and had been presented the optimum possible results [34] . Almost at the same time the strength of another light weight block ciphers SIMECK had been tested against Linear Cryptanalysis [35] . 
Old and Recent References on Differential Cryptanalysis
The design of a Feistel cipher with at least 5 rounds that has been resistant to differential cryptanalysis had been reported to crypto community [37] . The exploration of the possibility of defeating differential cryptanalysis by designing S-boxes with equiprobable output XORs using bent functions had been reported once [38] . The description of some design criteria for creating good S-boxes that are immune to differential cryptanalysis and these criteria are based on information theoretic concepts had been reported later [39] . It had been Introduced that the differential cryptanalysis on a reduced round variant of DES [40] and broke a variety of ciphers, the fastest break being of two-pass Snefru [41] and also described the cryptanalysis of the full 16-round DES using an improved version [40] [42] . It had been shown that there have been DES-like iterated ciphers that does not yield to differential cryptanalysis [43] and also introduced the concept of Markov ciphers and explained its significance in differential cryptanalysis. It had also been Investigated that the security of iterated block ciphers shows how to and when an r-round cipher is not vulnerable to attacks [44] . It had also been proposed that eight round Twofish can be attacked and investigated the role of key dependent S-boxes in differential cryptanalysis [45] . It had been on the same line with [38] but proposed that the input variables be increased and that the S-box be balanced to increase resistance towards both differential and linear cryptanalysis [46] . Early in this century in previous decade estimation of probability of block ciphers against Linear and Differential cryptanalytic attack had been reported. Later a new Algebraic and statistical technique of Cryptanalysis against block cipher PRESENT-128 had been reported [47] . Almost 3 year later a new technique entitled Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis had also been reported [48] . A detailed Comparative study of DES based on the strength of Data Encryption (DES) Standard against Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis had been reported later [49] . At last Constraints of Programming Models of Chosen Key Differential Cryptanalysis had been reported to crypto community [50] .
Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis of Stream Ciphers
In late 20th century A Stepping Stone of the Differential-Linear cryptanalysis method that is a very efficient method against DES had also been grounded [51] .
The relationship between linear and differential cryptanalysis and present classes of ciphers which are resistant towards these attacks had also been elaborated [52] . Description of statistical cryptanalysis of DES, a combination and improvement of both linear and differential cryptanalysis with suggestion of the linearity of S-boxes have not been very important had been depicted [53] . had also been proposed [54] . At the same time the attack on 7 and 8 round Rijndael using the Square method with a related-key attack that can break 9
rounds Rijndael with 256 bit keys had been described [55] . In Late or almost end of 20th century the strength of stream ciphers have been tested against Differential Cryptanalytic attack [56] . Later the strength of them had also been tested against Linear Cryptanalytic attack [57] . A separate method of linear cryptanalytic attack had been reported once [58] . At least 6 years later the strength of stream cipher Helix had been tested against Differential Cryptanalytic attack [59] . Later the strength of stream ciphers Py, Py6, and Pypy had also been tested again Differential Cryptanalytic attack [60] . Recently the test of strength of stream cipher ZUC against Differential Cryptanalytic attack had also been reported to crypto community [61] .
Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) of S-Boxes
In beginning Strict Avalanche Criterion of 4-bit Boolean Functions and Bit Independence Criterion of 4-bit S-boxes had been introduced [62] and Design of Good S-boxes based on these criteria had also been reported later [63] . In end of 20th century the construction of secured S-boxes to satisfy Strict Avalanche Criterion of S-boxes had been reported with ease [64] . The Test of 4-bit Boolean Functions to satisfy higher order strict Avalanche Criterion (HOSAC) have had also been illustrated [65] . In early twenty first century the analysis methods to Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) had been reported. A new approach to test degree of suitability of S-boxes in modern block ciphers had been introduced to crypto-community [66] . 16, 4-bit S-boxes had also been tested for optimum linear equivalent classes later [67] . The strength of several block ciphers against several Cryptanalytic attacks had been tested and reported later [68] . Recently the Key dependent S-boxes and simple algorithms to generate key dependent S-boxes had been reported [69] . An efficient cryptographic S-box design using soft computing algorithms have had also been reported [70] . In recent past the cellular automata had been used to construct good S-boxes [71] .
A Brief Review of Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-Bit S-Boxes and a New Technique with Boolean Functions for Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-Bit S-Boxes
The given 4-bit Crypto S-box has been described in Sub-section 3.1. The relation Between 4-bit Crypto S-boxes and 4-bit BFs has been illustrated in Subsection 3.2., The Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit Crypto S-boxes and DDT or Differential Distribution Table has been illustrated in Subsection 3.3. The Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit S-boxes with 4-bit BFs has been described in Subsection 3.4.
4-Bit Crypto S-Boxes
A 4-bit Crypto S-box can be written as Follows in 
Relation between 4-Bit S-Boxes and 4-Bit Boolean Functions
Index of Each element of a 4-bit Crypto S-box and the element itself is a hexadecimal number and that can be converted into a 4-bit bit sequence that are given in column 1 through G of row 1 and row 6 under row heading Index and S-box respectively. From row 2 through 5 and row 7 through A of each column from 1
through G of Table 2 
Review of Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-Bit Crypto S-Boxes [3] [4]
In The Column 1 in Table 3 
S-Box View of Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-Bit Crypto S-Boxes
The S-box with a particular input difference or ID from 0 to F in which all elements have the same value "B" in hex, is not a Crypto Box but an S-box and is shown in row 1 through G of Column 3 of Table 3 Table or DDT. It is shown in Table 4 as follows,
The count of each existing elements in DFSB have been put into Difference Distribution Table as follows, in row 2 of Table 5 . For Input Difference (ID) = "B" and Output Difference from 0 through F of row 1.
4-Bit binary Pattern View of Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-Bit Crypto S-Boxes
The corresponding 4-bit bit patterns of input S-box elements (ISB) has been shown from row 1 through G of Column 2 in Table 3 Table or DDT. It is shown in Table 6 .
The count of each existing elements in Bin DFSB have been put into the Differential Distribution Table as follows, in row 2 of Table 7 (a) for Binary Input Difference (Bin ID) "1101" and Output Difference from 0 through F of row 1.
The Total DDT or Difference Distribution table for 16 IDs for the given S-box has been shown below in Table 7 (b). The Pseudo Code has been given as follows, // Differential Cryptanalysis Block.
Pseudo Code for Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-Bit Crypto S-Boxes and Its Time Complexity Analysis
Step 01: For I =1:16; For J =1:16; For K =1:4; // Start of For Loop I, J, K respec-
End For K. End For J. End For I.// End of For loop K, J, I respectively // Generation of Difference Distribution Table. Step 
2) Pseudo Code of Algorithm of Differential Cryptanalysis S-Box View
The Pseudo Code has been given as follows, // Differential Cryptanalysis block
Step 
Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-Bit Bijective Crypto S-Boxes Using 4-Bit BFs
The Procedure to obtain four Input Vectors (IPVs) and Four Output BFs through G of row 6 in Table 9 . Again No Operation on 3 rd IPV means CIPV3 = IPV3 so resultant OPBF is as same as STEP1 and has been shown from column 1 through G of row 7 in Table 9 . Next to it, the complement of 2 nd IPV means interchanging each 2 bit halves of each 4 bit halves of each 8 bit halves of resultant OPBF. The resultant OPBF has been shown from column 1 through G of row 8
in Table 9 . Again the complement of 1 st IPV means interchanging each bit of each 2 bit halves of each 4 bit halves of each 8 bit halves of resultant OPBF, The resultant OPBF After operation has been shown in column 1 through G of row 9
in Table 9 . The Complemented OPBF has been the resultant OPBF of STEP4
and has been shown from column 1 through G of row A in Table 9 . Table 10 . Table 8 . Complement of IPVs due to a particular ID. Table 9 . Construction of DIBFs and DOBFs. Table 10 has been shown in Column 2 of row 2 of Table 11 . Table ( DAT) for a Certain ID Four IPVs in the order IPV4, IPV3, IPV2 and IPV1 for the S-box given in Table   1 and four CIPVs, CIPV4, CIPV3, CIPV2 and CIPV1 for a certain ID "1011" have been shown from column 1 through G of row 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 respectively in Table 12 . Four OPBFs in the order OPBF4, OPBF3, OPBF2 and OPBF1 for the S-box given in Table 1 and four COPBFs COPBF4, COPBF3, COPBF2
Generation of Difference Boolean Functions or DBFs for a Certain ID
ID 1 0 1 1 Complement C N C C
DBFs Generation and Derivation of a Particular Row of Differential Analysis
and COPBF1 for a certain ID "1011" have been shown from column 1 through G of row 9, A, B, C, D, E, F and G respectively in Table 12 . The resultant DBFs, DIFF4, DIFF3, DIFF2, DIFF1, have been shown in column 1 through G of row H, I, J, K of Table 12 . The number of 1s or Balanced-ness of four DBFs have been shown in row from Column 2 through 5 of row 1 in Table 13 .
Differential Analysis Table or DAT
The Balanced-ness of four DBFs for each ID have been shown from column 2 through 5 of row 2 through H of DAT or Table 14 . Step 
Pseudo Code for Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-Bit Crypto S-Boxes and Its Time Complexity Analysis

Comparison of Time Complexity of Two Views of Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-Bit S-Boxes and Differential Cryptanalysis with 4-Bit BFs
The Comparison of time complexity of three algos has been given in Table 15 of a BF designated as bf.bit0 to bf.bit15 using the following relations as given in Equation (2) anf .bit8 anf .bit9 anf .bit10 bf .bit7;
A Review of Boolean Functions (BF) and Its Algebraic Normal Form (ANF)
The DEBF (Decimal Equivalent of BF) varies from 0 through 65,535 and each decimal value is converted to a 16-bit binary output of the Boolean function from bf.bit0 through bf.bit15. Based on the binary output of a BF, the ANF coefficients from anf.bit0 through anf.bit15 are calculated sequentially using Equation (2).
A Review on Linear Cryptanalysis of 4-Bit Crypto S-Boxes [3] [4]
The given 4-bit Crypto S-box has been described in Sub-section 4.2. 
4-Bit Crypto S-Boxes
A 4-bit Crypto S-box can be written as Follows in Table 16 , where the each element of the first row of Table 16 is termed as 2 nd OPBF and Row A is termed as 1 st OPBF [2] . The decimal equivalent of each IPV and OPBF are noted at column H of respective rows.
4-Bit Linear Relations
The Table 19 . Table ( Table 20 then it is called as Linear Approximation Table or LAT. The Linear Approximation Table for the given S-box has been shown in Table 20 . Table 18 . IPVs and OPBFs for given S-Box. 
Linear Approximation
2 0 L 0,0 L 0,1 L 0,2 L 0,3 L 0,4 L 0,1+2 L 0,1+3 L 0,1+4 L 0,2+3 L 0,2+4 L 0,3+4 3 1 L 1,0 L 1,1 L 1,2 L 1,3 L 1,4 L 1,1+2 L 1,1+3 L 1,1+4 L 1,2+3 L 1,2+4 L 1,3+4 4 2 L 2,0 L 2,1 L 2,2 L 2,3 L 2,4 L 2,1+2 L 2,1+3 L 2,1+4 L 2,2+3 L 2,2+4 L 2,3+4 5 3 L 3,0 L 3,1 L 3,2 L 3,3 L 3,4 L 3,1+2 L 3,1+3 L 3,1+4 L 3,2+3 L 3,2+4 L 3,3+4 6 4 L 4,0 L 4,1 L 4,2 L 4,3 L 4,4 L 4,1+2 L 4,1+3 L 4,1+4 L 4,2+3 L 4,2+4 L 4,3+4 7 1 + 2 L 1+2,0 L 1+2,1 L 1+2,2 L 1+2,3 L 1+2,4 L 1+2,1+2 L 1+2,1+3 L 1+2,1+4 L 1+2,2+3 L 1+2,2+4 L 1+2,3+4 8 1 + 3 L 1+3,0 L 1+3,1 L 1+3,2 L 1+3,3 L 1+3,4 L 1+3,1+2 L 1+3,1+3 L 1+3,1+4 L 1+3,2+3 L 1+3,2+4 L 1+3,3+4 9 1 + 4 L 1+4,0 L 1+4,1 L 1+4,2 L 1+4,3 L 1+4,4 L 1+4,1+2 L 1+4,1+3 L 1+4,1+4 L 1+4,2+3 L 1+4,2+4 L 1+4,3+4 A 2 + 3 L 2+3,0 L 2+3,1 L 2+3,2 L 2+3,3 L 2+3,4 L 2+3,1+2 L 2+3,1+3 L 2+3,1+4 L 2+3,2+3 L 2+3,2+4 L 2+3,3+4 B 2 + 4 L 2+4,0 L 2+4,1 L 2+4,2 L 2+4,3 L 2+4,4 L 2+4,1+2 L 2+4,1+3 L 2+4,1+4 L 2+4,2+3 L 2+4,2+4 L 2+4,3+4 C 3 + 4 L 3+4,0 L 3+4,1 L 3+4,2 L 3+4,3 L 3+4,4 L 3+4,1+2 L 3+4,1+3 L 3+4,1+4 L 3+4,2+3 L 3+4,2+4 L 3+4,3+4 D 1 + 2 + 3 L 1+2+3,0 L 1+2+3,1 L 1+2+3,2 L 1+2+3,3 L 1+2+3,4 L 1+2+3,1+2 L 1+2+3,1+3 L 1+2+3,1+4 L 1+2+3,2+3 L 1+2+3,2+4 L 1+2+3,3+4 E 1 + 2 + 4 L 1+2+4,0 L 1+2+4,1 L 1+2+4,2 L 1+2+4,3 L 1+2+4,4 L 1+2+4,1+2 L 1+2+4,1+3 L 1+2+4,1+4 L 1+2+4,2+3 L 1+2+4,2+4 L 1+2+4,3+4 F 1 + 3 + 4 L 1+3+4,0 L 1+3+4,1 L 1+3+4,2 L 1+3+4,3 L 1+3+4,4 L 1+3+4,1+2 L 1+3+4,1+3 L 1+3+4,1+4 L 1+3+4,2+3 L 1+3+4,2+4 L 1+3+4,3+4 G 2 + 3 + 4 L 2+3+4,0 L 2+3+4,1 L 2+3+4,2 L 2+3+4,3 L 2+3+4,4 L 2+3+4,1+2 L 2+3+4,1+3 L 2+3+4,1+4 L 2+3+4,2+3 L 2+3+4,2+4 L 2+3+4,3+4 H 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 L 1+2+3+4,0 L 1+2+3+4,1 L 1+2+3+4,2 L 1+2+3+4,3 L 1+2+3+4,4 L 1+2+3+4,1+2 L 1+2+3+4,1+3 L 1+2+3+4,1+4 L 1+2+3+4,2+3 L 1+2+3+4,2+4 L 1+2+3+4,3+4 Rows Columns C D E F G 1 IPE = OPE 1 + 2 + 3 1 + 2 + 4 1 + 3 + 4 2 + 3 + 4 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 2 0 L 0,1+2+3 L 0,1+2+4 L 0,1+3+4 L 0,2+3+4 L 0,1+2+3+4 3 1 L 1,1+2+3 L 1,1+2+4 L 1,1+3+4 L 1,2+3+4 L 1,1+2+3+4 4 2 L 2,1+2+3 L 2,1+2+4 L 2,1+3+4 L 2,2+3+4 L 2,1+2+3+4 5 3 L 3,1+2+3 L 3,1+2+4 L 3,1+3+4 L 3,2+3+4 L 3,1+2+3+4 6 4 L 4,1+2+3 L 4,1+2+4 L 4,1+3+4 L 4,2+3+4 L 4,1+2+3+4 7 1 + 2 L 1+2,1+2+3 L 1+2,1+2+4 L 1+2,1+3+4 L 1+2,2+3+4 L 1+2,1+2+3+4 8 1 + 3 L 1+3,1+2+3 L 1+3,1+2+4 L 1+3,1+3+4 L 1+3,2+3+4 L 1+3,1+2+3+4 9 1 + 4 L 1+4,1+2+3 L 1+4,1+2+4 L 1+4,1+3+4 L 1+4,2+3+4 L 1+4,1+2+3+4 A 2 + 3 L 2+3,1+2+3 L 2+3,1+2+4 L 2+3,1+3+4 L 2+3,2+3+4 L 2+3,1+2+3+4 B 2 + 4 L 2+4,1+2+3 L 2+4,1+2+4 L 2+4,1+3+4 L 2+4,2+3+4 L 2+4,1+2+3+4 C 3 + 4 L 3+4,1+2+3 L 3+4,1+2+4 L 3+4,1+3+4 L 3+4,2+3+4 L 3+4,1+2+3+4 D 1 + 2 + 3 L 1+2+3,1+2+3 L 1+2+3,1+2+4 L 1+2+3,1+3+4 L 1+2+3,2+3+4 L 1+2+3,1+2+3+4 E 1 + 2 + 4 L 1+2+4,1+2+3 L 1+2+4,1+2+4 L 1+2+4,1+3+4 L 1+2+4,2+3+4 L 1+2+4,1+2+3+4 F 1 + 3 + 4 L 1+3+4,1+2+3 L 1+3+4,1+2+4 L 1+3+4,1+3+4 L 1+3+4,2+3+4 L 1+3+4,1+2+3+4 G 2 + 3 + 4 L 2+3+4,1+2+3 L 2+3+4,1+2+4 L 2+3+4,1+3+4 L 2+3+4,2+3+4 L 2+3+4,1+2+3+4 H 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 L 1+2+3+4,1+2+3 L 1+2+3+4,1+2+4 L 1+2+3+4,1+3+4 L 1+2+3+4,6 0 +2 −2 +4 +2 0 0 +2 0 −2 +2 +4 −2 0 0 −2 7 0 −2 0 +2 +2 −4 +2 0 −2 0 +2 0 +4 +2 0 +2 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −2 +2 +2 −2 +2 −2 −2 −6 9 0 0 −2 −2 0 0 −2 −2 −4 0 −2 +2 0 +4 +2 −2 A 0 +4 −2 +2 −4 0 +2 −2 +2 +2 0 0 +2 +2 0 0 B 0 +4 0 −4 +4 0 +4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 C 0 −2 +4 −2 −2 0 +2 0 +2 0 +2 +4 0 +2 0 −2 D 0 +2 +2 0 −2 +4 0 +2 −4 −2 +2 0 +2 0 0 +2 E 0 +2 +2 0 −2 −4 0 +2 −2 0 0 −2 −4 +2 −2 0 F 0 −2 −4 −2 −2 0 +2 0 0 −2 +4 −2 −2 0+2
Linear Approximation Analysis
4-Bit Crypto S-Boxes
A 4-bit Crypto S-box can be written as Follows in Table 21 , where the each element of the first row of Table 21 under column heading 4, 3, 2, 1 respectively from row 8 through M of Table. 23. 
Pseudo Code with Time Complexity Analysis of the Linear Approximation Analysis Algorithm
The Nonlinear Part for the given analysis has been termed as NP. The ANF coefficients are illustrated through array anf [16] . IPVs are termed as x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 for IPV1, IPV2, IPV3, IPV4 respectively. The Pseudo Code of algorithm of the above analysis is given below, Start.
Step 1. NP = (anf [5] .&x 1 &x 2 )^(anf [6] Step 2. LP= anf[0] ^(anf [1] .&x 1 )^ (anf [2] .&x 2 )^ (anf [3] .&x 3 )^ (anf [4] .&x 4 ).
Result and Analysis and Security Criterion for all Four Algorithms of 4-Bit Crypto S-Boxes
In 
The Analysis Criterion of Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-Bit S-Boxes
In Difference Distribution Table there 
The Analysis Criterion of Differential Cryptanalysis with 4-Bit BFs
As total number of balanced 4-bit BFs increases in Difference Analysis Table or DAT the security of S-box increases since balanced 4-bit BFs supplies at most uncertainty. Since Number of 0s and 1s in balanced 4-bit BFs are equal i.e. they are same in number means determination of each bit has been at most uncertainty. In the said example of 1 st DES 4-bit S-box total number of 8s in DAT are 36. That is close to 32 half of total 64 cells. So the S-box has been said to be almost less secure from this attack.
The Analysis Criterion of Linear Cryptanalysis of 4-Bit S-Boxes
In Linear Analysis Table or 
The Analysis Criterion of Linear Approximation Analysis of 4-Bit S-Boxes
The value of n C r has been maximum when the value of r is ½ of the value of n (when n is even). Here the maximum number of linear approximations is 64. 
Conclusion
In this paper, a detailed discussion on four cryptanalytic attacks on 4-bit Crypto S-boxes has been done. From their point of view of execution time of algorithms, the new attack Linear Approximation Analysis has been the best. A detail Analysis of 32 DES 4-bit S-boxes has also been included in this paper and it has been proved that DES S-boxes have constructed with the knowledge of Differential
Cryptanalysis of 4-bit Crypto S-boxes. All S-boxes are unsecure to rest of three attacks. So we cannot Consider DES S-boxes as cryptographically secure S-boxes.
